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Multiparty key agreement protocols
J.Pieprzyk and C.-H.Li
Abstract: A class of multiparty key agreement protocols based on secret sharing is presented. The
trust infrastructure necessary to achieve the intended security goals is discussed. Entity
authentication is suggested to be replaced by a less expensive group authentication. Two key
agreement protocols are discussed. The first is the group key agreement where all principals must
be active to call the conference. The other allows a big enough subgroup (controlled by the
threshold parameter t) to trigger the conference. It is proved that the protocols achieve key
freshness, key confidentiality, group authentication and key confirmation. A discussion about
possible modifications and extensions of the protocol concludes the paper.

1 Introduction

Most cryptographic tools can only be used if appropriate
cryptographic keys are known to the parties. The intrinsic
difficulty of key establishment in large computer networks
has led to the invention of public-key cryptography where
one of the keys can be made public, considerably simplifying the problem of key establishment. There are two well
known categories of key establishment protocols: key
transport and key agreement. Key transport protocols
enable two communicating parties to obtain a common
secret key by using pre-established secure communication
channels between them and a trusted third party (TTP).
Normally, the TTP is responsible for the generation of a
fresh secret key and the parties gratefully accept it.
Key agreement protocols, on the other hand, allow the
parties to interact with each other so that, they can derive a
common secret key. Moreover, they exercise equal influence on the final form of the secret. Although the TTP is
not directly involved in the protocol, its existence is crucial
as it provides the public keys of the parties, typically, in the
form of proper certificates (or public keys signed by the
TTP). The TTP has no access to the secret agreed between
the parties. That is why, in some applications, key agreement is preferred to key transport.
A natural evolution of cryptography has given rise to the
so-called multiparty cryptography (also termed group or
society oriented) with a key establishment protocol as its
integral part. Traditionally, the multiparty key establishment is also called conference key establishment.
The very first key transport protocol was published by
Needham and Schroeder [ l ] in 1978. There are three
players in it: two principals and a TTP. The principals
share secure channels with the TTP and the channels are
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used in the protocol to distribute the secret fresh key
generated by the TTP. It turned out that even this relatively
modest protocol goal was not attainable in the protocol. If a
transcript of the communications together with the secret
key is lost and is then found by an attacker, then the
attacker may pretend to be one of the parties and the other
principal has no way to tell apart messages generated in the
past from the present ones. In other words, the key
freshness is not guaranteed.
Public key cryptography was invented by Diffie and
Hellman [2]. The validity of the concept was illustrated on
an example showing how two principals may agree on a
secret key via a public negotiation. This is a classical key
agreement protocol. Unfortunately, the main weakness of it
was the lack of principals’ authentication : they can
establish a secret key but they do not know with whom.
This is to say that the protocol is subject to the man-in-themiddle attack. Diffie, et al. [3] modified the original
Diffie-Hellman protocol in which both principals are
able to authenticate each other. To implement it, a TTP
must provide authentic parameters of the principals.
The experience with key establishment protocols illustrates, sometimes very dramatically, that the design of
‘secure’ protocols is not easy. The main difficulty seems
to be a very vague definition of what we expect from secure
protocols. The expected security characteristics of the
protocol are called security goals. The security goals
must be defined well before the construction of the protocol. There is a generic collection of security goals which
typically includes key freshness, key confidentiality, prhcipal authentication and key confirmation.
Multiparty key establishment can be seen as a generalisation of two-party key establishment. The first multiparty
key agreement was published by Ingemarsson et al. [4]
which is a generalisation of the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Fiat and Naor [5] considered key agreement in the context
of broadcast encryption where the messages are to be
decrypted by groups. Burmester and Desmedt [6] showed
that if the group is able to structure itself into a ring, then
after two broadcasts per principal, the group is able to
derive a common secret key. Just and Vaudenay [7] showed
that the Burmester-Desmedt protocol fails to provide
entity authentication and suggested a protocol in which
two-party authentication is extended into the group authentication.
229

2 Multiparty cryptography
Secret sharing has become an indispensable cryptographic
tool whenever the control over execution of a cryptographic
operation is assigned to a group rather than to an individual.
Blakley [8] and Shamir [9] considered a key management
system in which the secret is collectively held by a group of
n principals allowing any t of them to recover the secret
( t 5 n). The access structure of the secret sharing determines the collection of all subsets of principals who are
authorised to recover the secret. One of the simplest access
structure is a (t, n) threshold scheme when any collection of
t or more principals are authorised to recover the secret.
Secret sharing is set up by an algorithm called the dealer.
It has to be run by a trusted party. For a given secret, it
produces shares of the secret and distributes them to
principals via secure channels. To recover the secret, a
currently active subset of shareholders pools the shares and
recovers the secret if it belongs to the access structure,
otherwise it fails with an overwhelming probability. The
recovery of the secret is typically implemented as the
combiner algorithm. It can be run collectively or by a
trusted party (for example one of the active principals who
is trusted by others). After secret recovery, the combiner
distributes the secret via secure channels to all active
principals. A good tutorial on secret sharing and the
vocabulary used can be found in [lo].
Secret sharing allows groups to define (via its access
structure) who is authorised to recover the secret. If a
cryptographic operation is activated by a proper secret key,
then to allow a group control over it, it is enough to give
shares of the secret using a secret sharing scheme with a
properly defined access structure. It should be no surprise
that secret sharing should be of great help in designing
conference key establishment protocols. Some of attractive
features of secret sharing are listed below.
(1) Access structure gives a convenient way to differentiate
principals and their power within the group. This could reflect
the amount oftrust assigned to each principal or perhaps, the
place of the principal in the organisation. If all principals are
equally trusted, or perhaps we are dealing with a democratic
organisation, then a threshold scheme is appropriate.
(2) Delegation is possible if a principal who holds her
share passes permanently or temporarily her share to a
delegated person or a group of people.
(3) Secret sharing used can reflect the formal parameters
of a conference, indicating how large a subset of active
principals has to be to call the conference. Again, if the
threshold secret sharing is acceptable, then the selection of
the threshold enables one to manipulate the size of the
group that is able to call on the conference.
(4) Secret sharing can be immunised against the loss of
shares by making it proactive with a share refreshment
protocol [I 11.
(5) Group authentication can replace principal authentication. Group authentication is a weaker requirement and, in
general, can be less expensive to achieve. This is the case
when principals do not need to know the precise composition of the currently active group but they need to be sure
that the group is large enough to conduct a valid conference.
(6) Cheating detection, well developed in secret sharing,
can be used to detect principals who misbehave during the
protocol execution.
Clearly, secret sharing has also some characteristics which
restrict its applicability for key establishment protocols.
The two most serious are: first, the group who wish to call
the conference must be known well ahead of the confer230

ence. The group can be composed by a trusted dealer or
collectively by all participants. Secondly, shares have to be
distributed to the principals via secure channels. Typically
the groups involved in the conference are known well in
advance and their memberships are fixed for some time so
the first characteristics seems not to be a problem. Moreover, secret sharing has, already developed methods and
techniques to deal with modifications of the group (enrolment and disenrollment [ lo]). The second feature is
unavoidable but can be dealt by conversion of secret
sharing into the conditionally secure setting in which
shares are communicated via less expensive broadcast
channels.
3 Trust infrastructure

A key establishment protocol can be seen as a cryptographic tool which allows one to extend an initial trust
which exists between principals A, B and their TTP to a
trust between the two principals. Needless to say, the
existence of trust is the necessary condition for any key
establishment protocol to work correctly and to achieve the
intended security goals. For instance, Needham and
Schroeder [ 111 used a TTP who generated a fresh session
key and transported it to principals via secure channels. In
their key agreement protocol, Diffie et al. [3] assumed that
any principal had the access to the other party’s authenticated public keys. The authenticated public keys were
displayed by a TTP in the form of certificates signed by
the TTP. Anyone who knew the corresponding (authentic)
public key of the TTP, could verify certificates.
There are three elements of trust infrastructure in secret
sharing: the dealer, the combiner and secure channels. Now
we discuss these components.

3. I Dealer
The role of dealer can be considered in the context of key
transport and key agreement. In key transport, the dealer
algorithm can be run by a TTP or a conference chair who
composes the principals into a group who are eligible to
call a conference. Next the chair determines a proper
access structure which reflects the position of each principal in the group and clearly identifies the smallest
subgroups which are still eligible to call on the conference.
Finally, the chair generates a fresh secret and divides it into
shares which are secretly communicated to the principals.
In key agreement, a TTP is a passive entity whose role is
restricted to the delivery of authentic parameters of the
principals (their public keys) on demand. The dealer must
therefore be run collectively by principals or, in other
words, every principal plays the role of dealer. Each
principal sets up her own secret sharing for the group of
her choice. Note that each principal has full control over
the access structure of her secret sharing. The shares are
next distributed secretly to the other principals. After all
the principals have distributed their shares, each principal
possesses her own share plus shares obtained from others.
Finally, each principal combines all shares into one, hoping
that the resulting secret sharing has an access structure
which is acceptable to all.
It is not difficult to notice that this approach can only
work if all the principals use the same type of secret
sharing which allows many instances of secret sharing
generated locally to merge into one (without a central
dealer). A broad class of secret sharing which allows one
to do this is linear schemes. Even dealing with linear secret
sharing does not solve the problem of different access
IEE Proc.-Compiit. Digit. Tech, Vol. 147, No. 4, July 2000

structures selected by individual principals. We know
however, that if each principal selects a (t, n ) Shamir
threshold scheme and distributes shares to the same collection of principals, then the resulting scheme is also a
threshold scheme. It is easy to check that if each principal
selects a different threshold but the collection of principals
is the same for all, then the threshold of the composed
sharing is the largest used by principals (with an overwhelming probability).
3.2 Combiner
The role of the combiner in secret sharing is to collect
shares from principals and if the currently active subset
belongs to the access structure, then the combiner can
recover the secret and communicate it to the principals via
secure channels.
In key establishment protocols, the role of the combiner
needs to be redefined. Note that if we assume that the
combiner is trusted then the principals do not need to send
their shares as the combiner can generate a fresh key
without interaction with the principals. The purpose of
secret sharing is to recover the key while in key establishment protocols any fresh key is good.
For key transport, there is a chair who designs a secret
sharing of threshold 2 for a fresh secret. Each principal
receives a single share while the chair holds the secret and
one extra share. The extra share is used to trigger the
conference by broadcasting it (broadcasting must be
authenticated). Each principal, takes her share plus the
one broadcast and recovers the secret key. Observe that
each principal plays the role of combiner.
Assume that there is no chair and the trusted dealer does
not participate in conferences but sets up a secret sharing
with a fresh key. If the secret sharing has the threshold
n I and the number of all shares is 3n (n is the number of
all eligible principals) and each principal is assigned three
shares, then to call on a conference, it is enough if n
principals broadcast their shares. Knowing n shares, each
principal can recover the secret key using her second share.
The third share can be applied to verify the validity of the
secret (or cheating detection). Clearly, a misbehaving
principal can broadcast two or three shares instead of
one. If a principal broadcasts two shares, she can recover
the secret but cannot verify it. If she announces three
shares, she cannot participate in the conference.
Consider the role of combiner in the context of key
agreement protocols. Assume that a (n 1, 2n) secret
sharing is set up collectively by all n principals so the
threshold is (n 1) and each principal holds two shares. To
call a conference, it is enough for the principals to broadcast their single shares. After the announcement of n
shares, each principal can apply the second share to recover
the secret (the threshold is ( n 1)).
The situation becomes more interesting if the call for a
conference can be made by any t out of n principals.

+

+

+

+

3.3 Communication channels
Interaction among the principals is done via different
communication channels.
Confidentiality channels are very expensive to set up and
use. Messages are encrypted before transmission so that
any outsider who gains access to the channel is unable to
understand them. Confidentiality channels can be implemented using symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. In
the case of symmetric cryptography, both the sender and
the receiver know the same cryptographic key. In asymIEE Proc.-Comput. Digit. Tech, Vol. 147, No. 4, July 2000

metric (or public key) cryptography, the sender key is
public but the receiver’s key is secret. Note that the
sender must make sure that the key is the authentic
public key of the intended receiver.
Authenticity channels are typically less expensive as
messages are communicated in plain and a relatively
short authentication string is attached to them. Typically,
the receiver can detect whether or not a message comes
from the correct source and has not been tampered with
during transmission. Authentication strings can be implemented using either digital signatures (every one can verify
whether or not the signatures match the messages and their
alleged sender), or message authentication code (MAC)
where only the holders of the secrets which were used to
produce the MAC can verify the validity of pairs: messages
and their MACS.
Broadcast channels are relatively cheap to implement.
The sender may set up her publicly accessible billboard (a
web page) on which she announces messages allowing the
interested parties to fetch messages when they need them.
Clearly, messages displayed on the billboard can be
authenticated by appending signatures to them.
A secure channel is one that provides both secrecy and
authenticity. All interactions in key transport protocols are
performed via secure channels implemented using either
secret-key or public-key cryptosystems. This was the case
for Needham-Schroeder protocols and their successors [ 13.
Key agreement protocols are normally supported by
public-key cryptosystems and broadcasting seems to be
the predominant way of message communication [ 121.
4

Security goals

Security goals may vary but there is a relatively small
collection of goals which are achievable in most conference key establishment protocols. Additionally, it is desirable that the protocol can be executed efficiently. The main
collection of security goals for key establishment protocols
are [12]: first, key freshness. The key has not been
generated or used before in any other conference. Typically, to ensure key freshness it is sufficient to generate the
key at random from a large population so the probability of
reusing some already generated keys, is negligible.
Secondly, entity authentication, this is a confirmation
process which allows one principal to correctly identify
the others involved in the protocol. Typically, it allows a
principal to check whether other principals are active
(alive) at the time when the protocol is being executed.
This requirement can be relaxed by defining group authentication in which every principal is sure that all the
principals are alive and present. This allows any principal
to identify the group rather than individuals. Weak group
authentication means that all currently active principals are
sure that there is a large enough group of active principals.
In most circumstances, a conference is considered to be
valid if a quorum of principals is present. The access
structure (or the threshold parameter) conveniently determines the size of a large enough group. Thirdly, key
confirmation, this is a property of the protocol which
allows one principal to make sure that the other parties
possess the same common key. This is typically achieved
by using the so-called handshaking or challenge-response
interaction. The idea is to generate a random challenge,
encrypt it using the key which needs to be confirmed and
to expect from the other party the correct response, which
is agreed before public transformation (say squaring the
modulo of some prime). Forthly, implicit key authentica23 1

tion this provides an assurance to principals that no one
except specific other parties could have gained access to
the common key. Implicit key authentication can be also
viewed as key confidentiality. Finally, explicit key authentication means that both implicit key authentication and
key confirmation hold.
In key agreement protocols, one would expect that the
control over the final form of the key is distributed over the
principals and there is no way that a subgroup of conspiring principals can force others to accept the key of their
choice. This goal can be termed group key control.
5

A new multiparty key agreement protocol

The proposed key agreement applies secret sharing generated independently by principals. Assume that there are n
principals P I , . . . ,P,, who are eligible to participate in a
conference. Each principal Pi; i = I , . . . ,n, creates her own
Shamir secret sharing defined by a polynomial f i ( z ) and
distributes shares to the members of the group using prearranged secure channels. The combined secret sharing is
defined by the polynomial
n

i= I

Note that the secret F(0) generated collectively by the
group is not known until the principals decide to pool their
shares to recover the secret. Moreover, the principals
contribute ‘equally’ to the fresh secret. The protocol
progresses through three major phases:
(1) Registration: each principal who wants to join the
conference registers herself with a trusted registry
(2) Initialisation: each principal creates her private secret
sharing scheme and distributes shares to all other principals
(3) Call for conference: principals broadcast their shares
and therefore enable themselves to recover a common
secret key.

5. I Assumptions
Our assumptions are listed as follows:
(i) there are n principals {Pl,. . . ,P,,} who want to joint the
conference,
(ii) there exists a trusted registry (R) who manages the
registration of principals. In particular, the registry keeps a
list of public keys of principals,
(iii) public information accessible from the registry is
authenticated by the registry. Typically, information is
accessible in a form of certificates signed by R,
(iv) secure channels provide both secrecy and authentication. Broadcast channels deliver authenticated messages to
all principals (messages can be read by all but nobody can
modify them without detecting the modification).
Let p and q denote large p$mes such that q divides p - 1.
Let G, be a subgroup of Z p of order q and g be a generator
of G,.
5.2 Registration
The principal Pichooses her own private key xi E Z; and
submits her public key hi =gxi (mod p ) for i = I , . . . ,n to
the registry R. When all the principals have completed
their registration, the registry R displays a read-only list of
public keys together with principals’ n%mes.Additionally,
R generates a random integer r E R Z , on demand and
232

displays CI =g‘ for a short period of time. Normally, the
value is generated whenever a need for conference arises
(indicated by the principals who wish to call a conference).
This value is erased after some time (when the conference
has finished). The same value CI is never used in two
different conferences.
Registration serves three purposes. The first one is that
each principal knows the other principals who are to join
the conference. The second one is that the public keys can
be used to implement secure channels between the principals. For example, the information provided by the registry
is enough to encrypt a messa$e using the ElGamal cryptosystem. Assume that m E Z, and PI wants to send the
message to Pj in e$crypted form. First, PI chooses a
random integer v E Z, and computes g”, h; and m x h,”.
The pair (g”, m x h,”)is sent to PI. The receiver P, takes the
which can later be used to
pair and computes (g”)”,=gvX~
extract the message m = m x h” x g-”J. The third purpose
is to supply the principals with fresh (random) elements CI
which are later used in the protocol.
5.3 Initialisation
This phase of the protocol is executed independently by
each principal and proceeds as follows:

+

(1) Pidesigns a (n 1, 2n) Shamir thresold scheme, i.e. a
scheme with 2n shares and with threshold n 1. Let the
scheme be defined by a random polynomialfi(z) of degree
at most n. Suppose that
A(z) = aj.0

+

+ a j p + . . . + ai,,,?

where coefficients u i , , ~ Z , * are chosen at random for
j = l , . . .,n. As usual in Shamir scheme, shares are
computed for 2n public z coordinates. We assume that Pi
is assigned a pair of coordinates zi= (2i - 1, 2i).
(2) Next Piprepares pairs of shares si, = f i ( z i )= (sj.’: =
fl(Y - 11,
=f,(W).
(3) Finally, PI communicates sf2: to the principal P,;
j = 1,. . . ,n;j # i via a secure channel. In effect, PI obtains
a sequence of n elements (s‘~), . . . ,sf!) and computes her
secret share Sf’ = x;=ls$l where SF) =F(2i) and the
polynomial F(z) = :=lfl(z).

4;)

is never exposed
Note that the secret s=F(O) = Cy=lu,,o
to principals. From now on s =F(0) will be called a seed to
differentiate it from a fresh secret key obtained by all the
principals involved in the conference.
5.4 Call for a conference
To start the conference, the principals execute the following steps:

(1) Pi contacts the registry and fetches necessary parameters including CI =$ (the registry selects r at random). If
the element CI is not on display, Pias$ R for one
( 2 ) Piprepares public shares pi,, = d 1 . j for J = 1, . . . ,n
(3) Pibroadcasts /Ii,, to all the principalsj = I , . . . ,n
(4) After Pi has obtained /Ij., from other principals, she
recovers n public shares

for j = l , ..., n
(5) PI uses n public shares and her secret share, S1(2)to
recover the common secret S=
= C I ~ . Note that the
principals still use the Lagrange interpolation but for
IEE Proc-Comput Digit Tech, 6 1 147, No 4>July 2000

exponents so

(4) After the conference has been called, every principal
can check whether other principals are holding the same
secret by verifying the triplets ( 0 , idJ, M ) for all j # i. The
key confirmation is satisfied. This completes the proof.
What if a subgroup of the principals does not follow the
protocol? Let us consider the following possibilities:

where

n-n

.i

b=

b. =

and

j=2,4 ...,2 n ; j f Z j - 2i

e=1,3, ...,2n-1; t#2j-l

e
e-2j+1

are Lagrange coefficients
(6) Pi takes the secret S, her name idi, and a and prepares a
where H is a cryptographically
string CT~=H(Sllidi) .1
strong, collision resistant hash function with a public
description. The triplet (o,, id,, a ) is broadcast (note that
the broadcasting channel is assumed to provide authentication).
(7) Pi collects (oj, idj, a ) from other principals, checks
their authenticity and verifies them using her own secret S.
If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference. Otherwise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol.

5.5 Security analysis
The following theorem describes which security goals are
achievable by the protocol.
Theorem I : Assume that the protocol is run by a group of
honest principals, then the protocol attains the following
security goals: (1) key freshness, (2) key confidentiality,
(3) group authentication, (4) key confirmation.
Pro08 (1) The*registry displays an integer a=$ for a
random
Note that the common secret key
S=f = as is fresh as long as r is fresh. The freshness is
probabilistic.
(2) Key,,confidentiality holds as after broadcasting the
shares as11, all outsiders know n public shares only.
As the Shamir scheme is perfect, it means that n shares
do not provide any information about the secret when the
threshold is n 1. The perfectness argument can only be
used if the secret sharing is used once. For a multiple use,
which is the case, the principals should be sure that the
threshold of the group secret sharing is exactly (n 1). A
simple way to decide whether the threshold is (n l), is to
check if the secret derived according to the protocol by a
principal is the same as the value obtained by the Lagrange
interpolation of public shares only. If the two values are the
same the threshold is not equal to ( n 1). It is easy to
verify that the probability of the threshold being (n
(1 - 4-1).
(3) Group authentication (by contradiction). Assume
that the protocol has been successful and the group
authentication does not hold. From this assumption we
will derive that instances of the discrete logarithm are easy
to invert (which is the requested contradiction). From our
assumptions we know that there is at least one principal,
say P,, who has not participated in the protocol. As the
threshold of the secret sharing is (n l), somebody had to
broadcast the prescribed collection of public shares
bJ,,= a ;i= 1, . . . ,n, on behalf of P,. This can be done
only if either the shares sj,'? can be extracted from the
public shares announced in the previous runs or the
random r can be extracted from CI = g". This leads us to
the conclusion that the discrete logarithm instances used
are easy, which is a contradiction.

+

+

+

+

(1) At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intentionally lower the thresholds used in their private secret sharing
schemes. This does not effect the work of the protocol as if
at least one principal is honest, the threshold will be
random and equal to (n+ 1) with the probability
(1 - 4-'). The subgroup of conspirators can establish a
conference but they compromise the confidentiality of their
secret (see Theorem 2).
(2) At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intentionally increase the threshold of their private schemes, then at
the call for conference stage, the principals who are honest
will recover inconsistent secrets and will abort the conference (see Theorem 3).
(3) At the call for conference stage, the subgroup can
broadcast modified shares of their private schemes. This
will be detected by honest principals when the secret is
verified.
(4) A disobedient principal Pi can make public her secret
sharing scheme (the polynomialf,(z)). The conference can
still be called but without involvement of PI. This is
another way of saying call conference whenever you
wish. P, can still participate in conferences if her share
S? remains secret. If P, goes further and discloses Sy),
then the secret key becomes public if the rest of the
principals follows the protocol. Otherwise if some principals refrain from broadcasting their public shares, the
conference will not go ahead.

Theorem 2. Given a group of n principals P,, . . . ,P, who
participate in the protocol. Assume that there is a subgroup
P,, . . . ,Pk of principals who lowered the threshold of their
private secret sharing schemes so
degJ;(z) = k
for i = 1, ,. . ,k and k < n. Then the subgroup can work
with their own secret sharing based on the polynomial

+

+

i=1

with the secret S' = aG('). This secret is known to the whole
group P,, . . . ,P,, and indeed to all outsiders.
Prooj If all principals broadcast their public shares, then
each principal can compute the secret S=aF(0) where
F(z)= C ~ , l f l ( z )A. principal P,; i= 1 , . . . , n , can
compute S' = aG(O) by simply ignoring all information
obtained from participants not belonging the the subgroup,
In particular, PIcomputes her secret share
li

and at the call for conference stage, calculates the following n public shares

J J
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i=l

As the secret sharing of the subgroup has the threshold
( k l), the Lagrange interpolation gives the same secret
S' = aG(') for any subset of k public shares. The subgroup

+
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can agree on the secret which is known to the whole group.
Moreover, an outsider can recover the secret S’ = aC(O)from
any (k+ 1) public shares. The subgroup may have a
conference which is public.
Theorem 3 Given a group of n principals PI,.. . ,P,, who
participate in the protocol. Assume that there is a dishonest
principal P, who deviates from the protocol by selecting
her random polynomialh(z) of degree (n 1). Then honest
principals P,; i = 2, . . . ,n detect this at the first run of the
protocol during the key confirmation stage.
Pro03 Without the loss of generality, we ignore exponentiation so, in other words, in the call for conference stage
the principals broadcast their shares s!,: (instead of
prescribed a’!::’). The proof is conducted by contradiction.
Assume that there are two principals who recover the same
secret. Let them be P, and P3. The secret sharing created
by the group in the initialisation stage is defined by
polynomial

+

F(z) = C . r ; ( Z ) .
i= 1

+ 1, the degree of F(z) is also (n + 1). P2
applies the Lagrange interpolation for the following (n + 1)

As degf,(z) = n

points:

(4, SF’), (1, sy),. . . , (2n - 1, Si’’)
where Sj”=F(2j - 1) and Sf’=F(4) and finds a polynomial G2(z). Similarly, P3 knows

where a l , . . . ,a, are random values generated by R. Note
that the strings oi,generated for key confirmation purpose,
are omitted from the view. The reason is that the assumption that the hash function is cryptographically strong is
not enough to draw any conclusions about the overall
security of the protocol. It is expected that hash function
must not share any homomorphic property with exponentiation [12].
Theorem 4. Given the protocol without key confirmation. If
the principals honestly follow the protocol and run it
successfully l times and the applied discrete logarithm
instances are intractable, then the seed s remains unknown
to principals (and outsiders).

Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the seed
can be obtained from a view Y.(l)using a polynomial-time
probabilistic algorithm A which takes the view as an input
and returns the seed, or A(Vi(l))=s. Consider an intractable instance of the DL problem defined by the pair (h, g )
such that h =e.For this instance, we create a view V&).
To do this, we need to design a secret sharing for g“. We
select at random integer U,,,, E ~ Z : and and
6, =gun,. . .
=gun-l.
Points
(l,guI),
(3,
g u 2 ) . . .(2n - 3, gu*i-l) together with (0, f)
and (2,
gun-!) uniquely determine the point (2n - 1, gun) using
the Lagrange interpolation for exponents. The view generated for the DL instance has the following form:

ay,.. . , a?,

4 = h‘’

at = g Q ,a,U , , . . . , a?,

= h‘e

a, = g‘l,

-+ (first run)

(6, Sp’),(1, Si”),. . . , (2n - I , Si’))
where Sf) =F(6) and determines a unique polynomial
G~(z)which contains the points. Both G2(z) and G3(z)
are of degree at most n. If both P2 and P, recover the same
secret, it means that G2(0) = G3(0).As the polynomials
G2(z) and G3(z) contains (n 1) common points ((1,
Sl”),. . . ,(2n - 1, Si’)) and (0, G2(0))), they have to be
identical so G2(z)=G3(z). On the other hand, knowing
( n 2) points

+

+

one could find F(z) using the Lagrange interpolation. Note
that these points also belong to G2(z)so F(z) = G2(z).This
implies that deg F(z) = n which is our requested contradiction. This completes the proof.
We claim that the protocol can be used repeatedly to call
conferences as the seed s remains secret and to recover the
fresh secret key S, the principals need to use secret sharing
to compute it.
Recall that the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is
defined as follows. Given the modulus N, the element g
and h =g“ modN. What is x. ?
Assume that the principals have been running the
protocol l times. We define a view Vi(l)of principal Pi
which specifies the information available to P, after e
successful executions of the protocol. It is easy to verify
that
~ ( =~r;(z>,
l )
~ i ( 2 )-+ (setup stage)

-+

(lth run)

+ public information)
where f’(z), and (a1,. . . ,a!) are random elements generated according to the protocol specification. We argue that
views y ( l ) and VDL(l)are statistically indistinguishable
[ 131. This is true as all elements are selected randomly and
uniformly. Now we can input the view V,,(l) into the
algorithm A . If the algorithm works for the view K(e), it
must also work for the view VDL(l)as both views are
statistically indistinguishable. This means that A retums x
and solve the intractable instance of the DL problem. This
is requested contradiction which proves the claim. This
completes the proof.
Consider the efficiency of the protocol. The first part in
which the principals design their private secret sharing
schemes is not computationally intensive. The reconstruction of the secret key S and the key verification constitute
the main computational overhead. To reconstruct the secret
key, the principals have to first compute their public shares
and later use the Lagrange interpolation to recover the
polynomial aF@) and the secret S = aF(O).
The communication overhead for the protocol consists
of two components. The first one involves confidential
delivery of the shares sf:) from any single principal to the
others. This consumes (n - 1) confidential transmissions
for every principal. The second component consists of
0)
This takes n broadcast
broadcasting shares PI, =
transmissions for all principals. Table 1 summarises the
communication and computation overhead for the protocol.
Our protocol compares favourably with other key agreement protocols. For example, the protocols by Burmester
and Desmedt [6] are designed with a specific network
configuration in mind. The most evident weakness of
CI’~.J.

Si”

a,, a, , . . . ,a$”. a.; + (first run)
SO)

a,,

ai , . . . , a$), ai -+ (lth run)

+ public information)
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Table 1: Communication and computation requirements for the main protocol

Registration
Setup

Computation
(calculations done by
each principal)

1 message sent to
registry

1 exponentiation

x 2 n 2 multiplications and
additions for computations of
shares

preparation

Call for conference

distribution

n messages sent to
other principals
via secure channel

share broadcasts

n broadcasts

n exponentiations

n exponentiations
( n + 1) exponentiations
(Lagrange interpolation)

key calculation
key confirmation

Hashing of a single message
and 1 exponentiation
for authentication

1 message broadcasts

their protocols seems to be the lack of principal authentication. Just and Vaudenay [7] incorporated the authentication of principals into the Burmester-Desmedt protocols
but the authentication can be achieved with the neighbouring principals only.
6

Communication
(message sent by
each principal)

where X is public (n x t) matrix whose any collection of t
rows constitutes a nonsingular matrix. She also distributes
auxiliary shares to her fellow principals so Pi obtains
for j = 1, . . . ,n; j # i via secure channels and additionally
si,,+]is communicated securely to all other principals. She
composes the auxiliary shares into a single auxiliary share

A (t,n) Multiparty key agreement

In general, conferences do not need the whole group to be
active. Assume that out of n members of the group, t are
allowed to call on the conference (t < n). The straightforward application of the previous protocol will not work.
Note that after the principals collectively set up the ( t 1,
2n) secret sharing, any group of active principals larger
than t will compromise the confidentiality of the agreed
key. One could solve this problem by requesting the
principals who are about to broadcast their public shares
to first contact the registry and ask it for permission. In this
case, the registry keeps account of who has already
contacted it and obtained permission. Some other possibilities are: to introduce an additional phase in which
participants announces the intention of broadcasting a
public shares by showing a random number. After the
phase lapses, the principals order the numbers. Only the t
top ones are allowed to participate in the share broadcasting. Another possibility is to broadcast public shares in
encrypted form. Later active principals order their
encrypted shares and only the t top principals broadcast
the corresponding decryption keys. This can be an attractive option as encryption can be based on a fast block
ciphet such as the DES algorithm.
The solution we present here is a modification of the
main protocol which preserve the overall structure and
more importantly, security evaluation obtained for the main
protocol is also valid here. The registration phase is as
before. In the initialisation phase, all the principals have to
be active and each principal Pi designs her own (t+ I ,
t 1) Shamir secret sharing defined by the polynomialf,(z)
and computes (t 1) shares s,,, =f,(j) where j = 1, . . . ,
t 1. She prepares y1 auxillary shares E ~ , such that

Ei

=

E i ,j

j= 1

and merges shares

so

+

+
+

+
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this share is common for all principals.
The principals collectively set up a (t 1, t
secret sharing with the underlying polynomial

+ + 1) Shamir

i= 1

Denote shares Si=F(i). Any collection of t or more
different auxiliary shares allows a principal to recover the
shares (SI,. . . ,S,). Again S,+] is known to all principals.
To trigger the conference, there must be at least t active
principals. Without the loss of generality, assume that the
active set A= { P I , .. . ,P t } and each Pi E A performs the
following steps:

(1) Contacts the registry and fetches necessary parameters
including a =g (the registry selects r at random). If the
element a is not on display, Pi asks R for one
( 2 ) Prepares public share pi= aEc and broadcasts it
( 3 ) Computes first shares (aS1,. . . ,as,) using Lagrange
interpolation (this step is identical to that used to recover
the secret for Shamir scheme, note that the computations
are done on exponents) and later calculates a common key
S = aF(0)using the complete set of shares (aS,,. . . ,aS,+1)
(4) Pi takes the secret S, her name idi, and a and prepares a
string 0,=H(Sllid,lla) where H is a cryptographically
strong, collision resistant hash function with a public
description. The triplet ( q i , id,,a ) is broadcast (note that
the broadcasting channel is assumed to provide authentication).
(5) Pi collects (oi, id,, a) from the other principals, checks
their authenticity and verifies them using her own secret S.
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If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference. Otherwise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol.
The protocol achieves the same security goals as the main
protocol. If a run of the protocol is successful, all currently
active principals know that there are at least t of them in the
group and the last steps allow them to identify them.
The modified protocol has the following remarkable
properties.
(1) A principal who does not belong to A, can always join
the conference later by using the public shares and key
confirmation strings
(2) A principal not in A can attend the conference
passively, i.e. collect all public information which allows
her to obtain the secret key. Later she can read all the
information exchanged during the conference without
others knowing that she is present
( 3 ) It is possible to add a new principal to the conference
(enrollment). It is sufficient for a newcomer to design her
private secret sharing and distribute her shares to other
members and other members give her their shares.

possible solution based on the concept of divisible shares
[14]. The principals take their shares and ‘divide’ them into
two parts: one will be used to produce public shares (using
exponentiation) and the second is used to compute the
common key. The effective threshold would in general, be,
much higher than t. If the principals decide collectively to
split their shares in two, then the effective threshold would
be 2t - 1 as if 2t - 1 principals pool their share halves
together, they will know (t - 1/2) public shares. This
together with their secret halves allows them to recover
the common key.
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